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INTRODUCTION
Recognition that juveniles are limited in their decisionmaking informs
most areas of the law. In recent years, the Supreme Court has afforded
enhanced protections to youth in the criminal context due to their
developmental immaturity and heightened state of vulnerability. But the
current legal framework surrounding interrogations and the admissibility
of confessions does not sufficiently protect youth from coercive
interrogation practices.
Due process requires that a confession be voluntary, with voluntariness
determined by a totality of the circumstances test. This standard aims to
protect vulnerable suspects from coercive practices, but it is too vague to give
useful guidance to both judges and police oﬃcers about the ways in which
youth are diﬀerent from adults. This can leave children subject to coercive
interrogation tactics, resulting in involuntary and often false confessions that
courts nonetheless regularly admit.
The inadequacy of the due process voluntariness standard demands a
reevaluation of how the law’s protective function can be improved. Contract
principles—which strive to protect a party’s autonomy while also protecting
that party from exploitation—can inform possible solutions to rebalance the
power dynamic between youth suspects and adult interrogators. In contract
law, the crux of proper bargaining is voluntary assent. But assent loses its
legal eﬀect where a superior party exerts undue inﬂuence or misrepresents
material information to get it, thereby overcoming the weaker party’s will and
stripping the agreement of its voluntary quality. Applying voluntary-assent
contract principles to the interrogation of juveniles in criminal cases might
yield useful insights into whether current standards for juvenile interrogations
meet due process standards.
This Comment argues that contract principles, which protect vulnerable
adults from coercion and misrepresentation in their everyday bargaining, can
inform due process protections for youth under criminal interrogation. To
this end, a confession should be deemed involuntary if it was obtained by
undue inﬂuence—in the form of extreme pressure or abuse of trust—or by
misrepresentation. This will add substance to the current voluntariness
standard, giving judges and police oﬃcers more guidance about proper police
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conduct. It will also prompt a shift from confession-seeking interrogation
techniques, like the Reid Method, in favor of information-seeking techniques,
like the PEACE Method.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the history of
juvenile interrogation law, the inadequacy of the current totality of the
circumstances test, and the Supreme Court’s recognition that children need
additional safeguards to meet the Constitution’s due process requirements.
Part II discusses the prevalence of false confessions, the factors that contribute
to false confessions, and the developmental differences between juveniles and
adults that make youth suspects more prone to giving false confessions.
Part III views current interrogation law through a contractual lens to
highlight how the current voluntariness standard is failing to protect juveniles
from coercive police tactics. More speciﬁcally, it explores how certain
interrogation techniques violate key voluntariness requirements in contract
law, inducing involuntary, and often false, confessions. Part IV explains how
embracing contract principles to help assess the voluntariness of a juvenile
confession will help protect youth from due process violations and bring
interrogation law in line with other areas of the law. Knowing that a judge
may deem a confession involuntary if undue inﬂuence or misrepresentation
occur provides straightforward guidance to oﬃcers and incentives to abandon
coercive tactics. In this section, I will also introduce the PEACE Method of
interviewing, which complies with the voluntariness principles imported by
contract law, as a viable alternative to the Reid Method. This Comment
concludes that these changes are warranted by the disproportionate number
of false confessions obtained from youth, the science explaining that
developmental diﬀerences cause this disproportionality, and the legal
recognition that youth defendants require additional safeguards.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Juvenile Interrogation Law
Affording enhanced protections to juvenile suspects during interrogations
is not a novel idea. In 1948, the Court decided Haley v. Ohio, invalidating a
juvenile’s confession as involuntary, and thus inadmissible, for the first time.1
The suspect was fifteen years old, interrogated by as many as six officers,
and the interrogation lasted from midnight until his confession around 5:00
am.2 A plurality concluded these circumstances were such that his confession

1
2

332 U.S. 596, 599-601 (1948).
Id. at 598-601.
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was involuntary due to coercion.3 The Court recognized that children are more
susceptible to police pressures, declaring, “when, as here, a mere child—an
easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record
must be used.”4 Fourteen years later, the Court echoed this reasoning in
Gallegos v. Colorado.5 The Court found the confession of a fourteen-year-old
boy, who was detained for five days without being advised of his rights or the
ability to see a lawyer or parent, to be involuntary.6 The Court noted the power
disparity between the interrogator and the teenage defendant and reasoned
that the defendant could not “be compared with an adult in full possession of
his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.”7
In deciding these cases, the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, which has provided a constitutional limit on police
interrogations since the 1930s.8 Due process requires that a confession be
voluntary, meaning that the confession be made freely, and not be the product
of coercion that overcomes the will of the individual.9 In determining
voluntariness, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test, which requires
judges to evaluate “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation.”10
Factors that judges take into account include the suspect’s age, education,
the length of detention, the nature of the questioning, and the use of physical
force.11 Aside from the use of physical force, however, there is no particular
tactic that, standing alone, renders a statement involuntary.12 Instead, judges
must “throw all of these factors into a hat, mix them up in a totality of the
circumstances approach, reach in and attempt to pull out the answer to a
Id. at 600-01.
Id. at 599; see also id. (“That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of
adolescence produces.”).
5 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
6 Id. at 49-50, 55.
7 Id. at 54; see also id. (“[W]e deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and
understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to
know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.”).
8 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 286 (4th ed. 2020).
9 See BARRY FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM
14 (2013) (“The due process approach focused on a person’s ‘free will’ decision to make a statement
. . . . ‘[W]hether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement oﬃcials was such as to overbear [the
suspect’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . .’”) (second
alternation in original). Feld explains that the question of voluntariness turns on “whether the state
used fundamentally unfair or coercive tactics to obtain a statement” and statements will be excluded
if “elicited by psychological or physical coercion.” Id. at 5.
10 Id. at 15 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
11 Id. at 15-16.
12 See id. at 15 (“Except in extreme cases of physical brutality, judges faced a diﬃcult task to
distinguish voluntary from coerced confessions.”).
3
4
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question that can never be answered with confidence by a judge, psychiatrist,
or magician.”13 This abstract test—taking into account this laundry list of
factors—can lead to arbitrary and inconsistent decisions.14
Shortly after Gallegos, the Supreme Court recognized the shortcomings of
the voluntariness standard and supplemented this nebulous standard with the
Fifth Amendment’s protections against self-incrimination found in Miranda
v. Arizona.15 The Miranda Court decided that preventative measures were
necessary to protect suspects from coercion inherent in custodial
interrogations, reasoning that “[u]nless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice.” 16 Therefore, under Miranda, oﬃcers are required to warn suspects of
their right to silence and counsel before proceeding with any custodial
interrogation.17 The following year, the Court extended these protections to
youth in In re Gault.18
The Gault Court saw custodial interrogations as even more coercive for
young suspects. It declared that “admissions and confessions of juveniles
require special caution,”19 and therefore, “the greatest care must be taken to
assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”20
Following these cases, which placed additional constitutional limits on
interrogation practices, Miranda-based Fifth Amendment claims—not
voluntariness claims—have become the primary vehicle for efforts to suppress
13 Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for
Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 469 (2005) (footnote omitted).
14 See FELD, supra note 9, at 17 (“Tactics that rendered one suspect’s confession involuntary
might not produce a similar outcome in another case with somewhat diﬀerent facts.”); cf. FELD,
supra note 9, at 14 (explaining that the Supreme Court “could more easily articulate [the]
constitutional values” behind the voluntariness requirement than “provide guidance for trial judges”
on how to apply these values in practice).
15 See 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“[W]e can readily perceive an intimate connection between
the privilege against self-incrimination and police custodial questioning.”).
16 Id.; see also RONALD J. ALLEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 869 (3d ed. 2016) (explaining that
there was dissatisfaction with the voluntariness test because its subjectivity failed to make clear to
lower courts and police what it would take to render a concession voluntary, prompting the Court
to seek alternatives to this test).
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.”).
18 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against
self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.”).
19 Id. at 45.
20 Id. at 55.
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confessions.21 However, where due process voluntariness arguments are still
made, courts weigh valid Miranda waivers heavily without engaging in an
evaluation of the tactics used during the interrogation itself.22
This heavy reliance on Miranda is problematic not only because it detracts
from a thorough due process evaluation, but also because the development of
key case law relating to juveniles’ Miranda rights predates the scientiﬁc
ﬁndings that youth are developmentally diﬀerent from adults.23 In Fare v.
Michael C., the Court addressed a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights for the
ﬁrst time.24 The Court held that a sixteen-year-old suspect’s explicit request
to speak with his probation oﬃcer during an interrogation did not constitute
a request for counsel, and thus an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights
under Miranda.25 The primary issue was whether juveniles should be judged
by the same standard as adults when determining the validity of a Miranda
waiver.26 And despite earlier recognition of heightened protections for youth
during interrogations,27 the Court found that the same totality of the
circumstances test used to assess the validity of an adult’s Miranda waiver was

21 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession
Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 109, 131-33 (2012) (noting that defense attorneys began
relying less on due process involuntariness claims and more on Miranda-based claims because
“Miranda was not only the better constitutional basis for seeking to suppress a confession, but
essentially the only constitutional claim worth raising in most cases”).
22 See FELD, supra note 9, at 250 (explaining that the objectivity of the Miranda factor has
distracted judges from evaluating the tactics used to elicit confessions); see generally infra Section
III.A (explaining the implications of relying heavily on Miranda in assessing the voluntariness of
a confession).
23 For a 1979 juvenile Miranda waiver case that predates the scientiﬁc ﬁndings that children’s
brains do not fully develop until adulthood, see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). For more
recent scientiﬁc ﬁndings on the development of children’s brains, see, for example, Mariam Arain
et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 44953 (2013) (discussing the progress that has been made in the last twenty-ﬁve years in understanding
“that several major morphological and functional changes occur in the human brain during
adolescence”); Elizabeth Cauﬀman & Laurence Steinberg, Emerging Findings from Research on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 428, 440 (2012) (discussing
how the results of a study suggest how psychosocial inﬂuences aﬀect legal decisionmaking and “a
much stronger tendency for adolescents than for young adults to make choices in compliance with
the perceived desires of authority ﬁgures”); Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain
Development Inform Public Policy?, 50 CT. REV. 70, 70 (2014) (“There is now incontrovertible evidence
that adolescence is a period of signiﬁcant changes in brain structure and function. Although most of
this work has appeared just in the past 15 years, there is already strong consensus among
developmental neuroscientists about the nature of these changes.”).
24 442 U.S. at 726-27.
25 Id. at 723-24.
26 Id. at 725.
27 See supra notes 1–7, 18–20 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions that
aﬀorded enhanced protections to youth).
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“adequate” in assessing the validity of a juvenile’s waiver, 28 leaving youth
without increased protections during interrogations.29
B. Continued Recognition That Juveniles Are Diﬀerent
Today, we know that juveniles are developmentally different from adults,
and with the science to support these findings, courts have once again begun
to account for juvenile differences. Research on adolescent brain development
shows that the prefrontal cortex of the brain does not fully develop until
adulthood, which developmental psychologists now consider to happen around
age twenty-five.30 This area of the brain is responsible for judgment, maturity,
foresight, self-control, and decisionmaking, which helps us understand why
children and adolescents are “especially at risk” in the criminal justice system.31
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that
juveniles have reduced moral and developmental capacity, and thus should be
held to a diﬀerent standard by the justice system than adults. In 2005, Roper
v. Simmons abolished the death penalty for individuals who were under
eighteen years old at the time they committed a crime.32 The Court drew
from adolescent brain research showing that youth “are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative inﬂuences and outside pressures” than adults.33
Applying similar reasoning, the Court prohibited life without parole
sentences for non-homicide oﬀenses committed by individuals under
eighteen years old in Graham v. Florida five years later.34 The Court
28 See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (explaining that “[t]here is no reason to assume that . . . juvenile
courts, with their special expertise in this area—will be unable to apply the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis,” which must account for “the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence”). But see FELD, supra note 9, at 8 (explaining how research “indicates
that young and mid-adolescents do not possess the competence of adults to exercise Miranda”).
Although a consideration of these factors would suggest courts invalidate many Miranda waivers,
trial courts consistently “ﬁnd that children as young as ten or eleven years of age, with no prior law
enforcement contact, with limited intelligence or signiﬁcant mental disorders, and without parental
assistance made valid waivers.” Id. at 43.
29 See Fare, 442 U.S. at 729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have
adopted broader protections for juvenile suspects by holding that a juvenile’s request for any adult
“obligated to represent his interests” should be treated as an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights).
30 Cf. Arain et al., supra note 23, at 456 (discussing how the prefrontal cortex “matures
independent of puberty and continues to evolve up until 24 years of age”).
31 FELD, supra note 9, at 252; see also INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS:
AN EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 4 (2012)
[hereinafter IACP] (“Because the pre-frontal cortex is not fully developed until the end of
adolescence, it does not regulate a teenager’s judgment and decision-making as well as in adults.”).
32 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
33 Id. at 569; see infra Part II (providing a more in-depth explanation of adolescent brain
development); see also infra Section III.C and Section III.D (using research on adolescent
development to explain why youth are particularly susceptible to coercive interrogation tactics).
34 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010).
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explained that juveniles have “[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term
consequences” and “limited understandings of the criminal justice system
and the roles of the institutional actors within it.”35 The Court extended that
prohibition to sentences for homicide convictions of juveniles in Miller v.
Alabama in 2012, just two years later.36 Again, the Court premised its holding
on the idea that juveniles have not developed adult decisionmaking
capacity.37 These cases, coined the “Roper trilogy,” collectively hold that
juveniles are “intrinsically and developmentally different from adults” and
thus deserve greater protections when facing prosecution.38
In the custodial interrogation context, the Supreme Court has started to
apply these scientiﬁc ﬁndings.39 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court
unequivocally acknowledged that age must be considered when determining
whether a suspect is in custody and thus entitled to Miranda warnings.40
Here, the Court reviewed the admissibility of an un-Mirandized statement
made by a thirteen-year-old boy while being questioned by a uniformed
oﬃcer and school administrators in a school conference room.41 The Court
remanded the case, mandating that the lower court consider the child’s age at
the time of the interrogation to determine if he was in custody, recognizing a
child’s age will impact how he will perceive his freedom to leave.42 The Court
grounded its reasoning in “common sense”43 and the widespread legal and
judicial recognition that children, as a class, are diﬀerent from adults and
therefore need diﬀerent protections.44 This represented an important step
Id. at 78.
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
Id. at 479-80.
Ariel Spierer, Note, The Right to Remain a Child: The Impermissibility of the Reid Technique in
Juvenile Interrogations, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1738 (2017).
39 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2011) (citing social science and cognitive
science authorities to conﬁrm fundamental diﬀerences between juvenile and adult minds).
40 See id. at 265 (“Seeing no reason for police oﬃcers or courts to blind themselves to that
commonsense reality [that children are more susceptible to police questioning], we hold that a child’s
age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.”).
41 Id. at 265-68.
42 Id. at 271-72.
43 See id. at 279-80 (“[O]ﬃcers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural
anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult.”).
44 The Supreme Court stated,
35
36
37
38

[L]egal disqualiﬁcations placed on children as a class—e.g., limitations on their ability
to . . . marry without parental consent—exhibit the settled understanding that the
diﬀerentiating characteristics of youth are universal. . . . As this discussion establishes,
“[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition” that children cannot be
viewed simply as miniature adults. We see no justiﬁcation for taking a diﬀerent course
here.
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towards recognizing the need for added protections for juveniles in the
custodial interrogation context because presumably, more juvenile suspects are
given Miranda warnings when age is a relevant factor in the custody analysis.
However, the protections of J.D.B. only extend so far. The J.D.B. Court
reasoned that youth are particularly vulnerable to both custodial pressures
and coercive interrogation tactics,45 but this decision only held that age is
relevant to the custody analysis—it did not reach questions about
interrogation practices.46 It also did not rein in courts from over-emphasizing
Miranda waivers when considering voluntariness due process challenges,
leaving youth vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics.47
The Supreme Court now explicitly acknowledges that a defendant’s youth
demands heightened criminal protections.48 The Court’s reasoning in the
interrogation line of cases and the “Roper trilogy” comprehensively explain
the developmental diﬀerences that make youth more likely to succumb to
interrogation pressures, resulting in involuntary and even false confessions.49
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet extended these protections to
the interrogation context. This leaves youth vulnerable to coercive
interrogation tactics overtly aimed at inducing confessions.
II. THE PREVALENCE OF FALSE CONFESSIONS, PARTICULARLY
AMONG YOUTH
A false confession is an admission of guilt along with a “postadmission
narrative” about “a crime that the confessor did not commit.”50 False
confessions are a leading causes of wrongful convictions, contributing to
Id. at 273-74.
45 Id. at 271-72.
46 See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1740 (recognizing that J.D.B. “addressed the ‘custodial’ aspect
of a custodial interrogation,” but not “what actually happens once an oﬃcer gets a juvenile suspect
alone in the interrogation room”).
47 See infra Section III.A (explaining the perverse eﬀects of Miranda in relation to the
voluntariness test).
48 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2015) (“[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to
take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be ﬂawed.”); J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272
(explaining that a child’s age is not merely a chronological fact, “[i]t is a fact that generates
commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception. Such conclusions apply broadly to
children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself, including any
police oﬃcer or judge.” (internal citations omitted)).
49 See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 269 (explaining that the risk of custodial pressure inducing false
confessions is “all the more acute . . . when the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile”); see
also id. at 264-65 (considering a child’s age to be relevant in determining whether the child was in
custody because “[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave”).
50 Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 333 (2009).
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“roughly 25% of all convictions that were later overturned based on DNA
evidence.”51 They are also one of the most misinterpreted “causes of error” in
the criminal justice system because the occurrence of false confessions
remains counterintuitive to many people who incorrectly assume that people
will not act counter to their self-interest and falsely confess to a crime they
did not commit.52 This assumption persists because people are often
unfamiliar with the causes of false confessions.53
For a false confession to occur, law enforcement must first misclassify an
innocent person as guilty.54 After this misclassification, researchers have
determined that the following factors contribute to false confessions: (1) the
“compromised reasoning ability of the suspect” due to age or limited education;
(2) a young person’s desire to please authority figures; (3) “the real or perceived
intimidation of the suspect by law enforcement”; (4) the perceived threat of
force by law enforcement during the interrogation; (5) “untrue statements
about the presence of incriminating evidence”; and (6) “[f]ear, on the part of
the suspect, that failure to confess will yield a harsher punishment.”55
Each of these factors is inherently present when oﬃcers employ the Reid
Method of interrogation—the most common interrogation technique in the
United States—while interrogating youth suspects.56 The Reid Method is a
confrontational, guilt-presumptive, accusatory form of questioning.57 It
consists of maximization techniques, which exert pressure on the suspect to
confess by accusing him of lying and threatening harsher treatment, as well
as minimization techniques, which minimize the suspect’s culpability by
rationalizing the crime and implying promises of leniency.58 Using these
techniques in tandem may wear the suspect down and convince him that the
only way to escape this stressful experience is to comply with the
interrogators’ wishes.59 When this occurs and a suspect confesses merely

51 Understand the Problem, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH
(Oct. 28, 2019), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictionsyouth/
understandproblem/ [https://perma.cc/8SER-RJZS].
52 Leo, supra note 50, at 332-33.
53 Id. at 333.
54 Id. at 334.
55 False Confessions & Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessions-recording-interrogations/ [https://perma.cc/BM7377QD].
56 Spierer, supra note 38, at 1725.
57 Id. at 1721.
58 FELD, supra note 9, at 110-11, 126-27.
59 See Leo, supra note 50, at 335 (describing the process in which an interrogated person is made
to feel that “he has no choice but to comply with the wishes of the interrogator” as a form of
psychological coercion used in interrogation).
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based on the perception that he has no choice but to do so, this confession is
involuntary by deﬁnition and may also be false.60
Although the Reid Method serves to exploit all suspects’ vulnerabilities,
even those of the most hardened criminals, youth suspects are particularly
susceptible to giving false confessions, as the factors above suggest.61 In fact,
youth only represent about 8.5% of all arrests,62 yet in a study of 113
documented false confessions, they made up about one-third of the false
confessions.63 This disproportionate rate of false confessions from youth can
primarily be attributed to the developmental diﬀerences between juveniles
and adults.64
The prefrontal cortex of the brain, which is responsible for judgment and
decisionmaking, continues to develop until the end of adolescence.65
Developmental changes within this brain region are essential to both
developing higher-order cognitive functions, such as foresight, and the
weighing of risks and rewards.66 As a result, adolescents tend to favor shortterm, immediate rewards without properly weighing long-term
consequences.67 Coinciding with these ﬁndings is research that demonstrates
60 See id. (“When a suspect perceives that he has no choice but to comply, his resultant
compliance and confession are, by deﬁnition, involuntary and the product of coercion.”).
61 See id. (“Highly suggestible or compliant individuals are not the only ones who are unusually
vulnerable to the pressures of police interrogation. So are the developmentally disabled or
cognitively impaired, juveniles, and the mentally ill.”).
62 Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confession, 64 UCLA L. REV. 902, 920 (2017) (citing Crime
in the United States 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-theu.s.-2015/tables/table-38 [https://perma.cc/E684-A8TY] (reporting that 709,333 persons under
eighteen years old were arrested in 2015)).
63 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problems of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 944 (2004).
64 See IACP, supra note 31, at 4 (“Because the pre-frontal cortex is not fully developed until the
end of adolescence, it does not regulate a teenager’s judgment and decision-making as well as in
adults.”); see also FELD, supra note 9, at 252 (“Research on adolescent brain development, judgment,
maturity, and self-control demonstrates why younger juveniles are especially at risk.”).
65 IACP, supra note 31, at 4; cf. Abigail Kay Kohlman, Kids Waive the Darndest Constitutional
Rights: The Impact of J.D.B. v. North Carolina on Juvenile Interrogation, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1623,
1627 (2012) (“[Juvenile] suspects are terriﬁed, alone, and surrounded by indicia of authority.”).
66 See Robert E. Shepherd, The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Defense, 19 CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 2005, at 51 (explaining that the prefrontal cortex–“which plays a critical role in the executive
functions of the brain–those involved when a person plans and implements behaviors by selecting,
coordinating, and applying the cognitive skills necessary to accomplish goals”–is still maturing
during adolescence, which can lead to “impairments of foresight, strategic thinking, and risk
management”).
67 IACP, supra note 31, at 4; see also FELD, supra note 9, at 240 (explaining that juveniles’
“impulsive decision-making, limited ability to consider long-term consequences, and greater desire
to obey and please authority ﬁgures heightens their risk” to falsely confess); Laurence Steinberg,
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466 (2009)
(explaining the neurobiological evidence that supports the notion that adolescent brains develop
better executive functioning capacity, including the ability to plan and balance risks and rewards).
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that youth tend to be highly compliant toward authority ﬁgures, trusting of
authority, and acquiescent due to their eagerness to please authority ﬁgures.68
This is why adolescents often comply with police, oﬀering confessions
without considering the long-term consequences.69
III. VIEWING INTERROGATION TACTICS THROUGH
A CONTRACTUAL LENS
This section uses contract principles to demonstrate that current due
process and Miranda protections are inadequate and explores how popular
interrogation tactics violate key voluntariness requirements in contract law,
inducing involuntary, and often false, confessions. Principles from contract
law may be able to provide protection for youthful suspects in ways that due
process and Miranda rules cannot. Contract law seeks to protect weaker
parties without infringing on their autonomy, ensuring that ostensibly
voluntary agreements are actually that. While diﬀerent policy considerations
underlie contract and criminal law, the voluntariness protections from the
former are necessary and would be eﬀective in protecting the rights of youth
facing criminal interrogation.
Drawing from other areas of law, particularly in the juvenile context, is
not new. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court noted that tort law’s
“reasonable person” takes into account what is typical for children and applied
this approach to the criminal context.70

68 Leo, supra note 50, at 336; see also Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial:
A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357
(2003) (“Adolescents are more likely than young adults to make choices that reﬂect a propensity to
comply with authority ﬁgures, such as confessing to the police rather than remaining silent or
accepting a prosecutor’s oﬀer of a plea agreement.”).
69 Leo, supra note 50, at 336; see also Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False
Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 953 (2010) (“Many traits of adolescence,
such as a foreshortened sense of future, impulsiveness, and other deﬁning characteristics of youth
. . . help to explain why juveniles falsely confess to police….”).
70 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(providing for a standard for children of “a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience
under like circumstances,” on the basis that “[a] child is a person of such immature years as to be
incapable of exercising the judgment, intelligence, knowledge, experience, and prudence demanded
by the standard of the reasonable man applicable to adults”). As RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) explains, this modiﬁed standard of conduct for children
reﬂects the notion that
a standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk. . . . [m]ust be the same for all persons, since the law can have no
favorites; and yet allowance must be made for some of the diﬀerences between
individuals, the risk apparent to the actor, his capacity to meet it, and the
circumstances under which he must act.
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A. Miranda Does Not Manifest Voluntariness
Contract law values protecting a party’s reliance on objective assent to an
agreement, however, courts have developed doctrines to ensure that a contract
will not be enforced against a party whose objective assent was not voluntary.71
These doctrines protect vulnerable parties by allowing courts to look “beyond
the manifestation of intent.”72 The justiﬁcation is that “adher[ing] to
objectivity could mask the fact that the apparent assent was not genuine, but
was obtained by deceit or improper bargaining tactics.”73 In such instances
where assent is not truly voluntary, the contract will be voidable.74
Similar to contract law, where an objective test to determine assent is
insuﬃcient to speak to a party’s voluntariness in entering the agreement,
viewing a waiver of Miranda as objective proof that a confession is voluntary
is insuﬃcient to speak to a party’s voluntariness. Nevertheless, in the postMiranda era, courts evaluating the admissibility of a confession tend to focus
narrowly on whether police gave a Miranda warning and suspects waived their
rights, rather than on the voluntariness of the confession itself.75
While the Miranda Court should be praised for its eﬀorts to inform
suspects of their rights and empower them to assert those rights, the use of
Miranda in the intervening decades demonstrates that merely advising
suspects of their rights is not the same as ensuring their protection.76
Consequently, Miranda has failed in its attempt to rectify the shortcomings
of the voluntariness standard because after suspects waive their Miranda
rights, oﬃcers proceed with the same interrogation techniques they used to
secure waivers, leading suspects to fall victim to these pressures again.77
Further, when courts ﬁnd a valid waiver of Miranda, the inquiry tends to end
there.78 Courts commonly defer to the Miranda safeguard, using the fact that
BRIAN BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 415 (5th ed. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.
See FELD, supra note 9, at 7 (stating that trial judges have a narrow focus “on whether police
gave and suspects waived their rights, rather than on the voluntariness and reliability of
confessions”); see also id. at 250 (“Miranda allows judges to focus on ritualistic compliance with a
procedural formality rather than to examine closely the voluntariness of a waiver or reliability of
statements.”); cf. id. at 247 (explaining that “rather than handcuﬀ the police, the warnings have
liberated them,” because adhering to Miranda aﬀords a path to admissibility).
76 See id. at 7 (“Miranda has transmogriﬁed from a protection for suspects to a safe harbor for
police.”).
77 See id. at 247 (“Despite the warning, people succumb to the compulsive pressures the
warning is supposed to dispel, and they waive constitutional protections at very high rates. . . . Police
interrogation practices did not change after Miranda.”).
78 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004) (explaining that “giving the warnings
and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility . . . and litigation over
voluntariness tends to end with the ﬁnding of a valid waiver”); see also FELD, supra note 9, at 250
71
72
73
74
75
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warnings were given as objective proof that the suspect’s due process rights
were not violated, rather than probing deeper into this appearance of
voluntariness as contract law courts do.79
This overreliance on Miranda when determining admissibility is
misguided. First, it assumes that the waiver itself was valid. A waiver is only
valid if it “is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently.”80 In other
words, a suspect must understand the Miranda vocabulary words and their
meaning in Miranda contexts, appreciate the beneﬁts or consequences of
invoking or waiving their rights, and provide the waiver and statement free
from police coercion.81 However, comprehension studies consistently
demonstrate that juveniles neither understand nor appreciate the meaning or
legal consequences of the warnings they are waiving.82 Nevertheless, courts
tend to deem these waivers valid.83
Second, even assuming the waiver itself is valid, the constitutional
requirement that suspects confess voluntarily is separate from the
constitutional requirement that suspects be Mirandized.84 Therefore a
(arguing that today “judicial review of a Miranda waiver is the beginning and the end of regulating
interrogation”); Lapp, supra note 62, at 927 (explaining that “Miranda was not meant to displace the
due process voluntariness inquiry,” but it nevertheless “has become little more than a checkbox that
police can easily satisfy in order to obtain an admissible confession”).
79 See Amelia Courtney Hritz, Comment, “Voluntariness with a Vengeance”: The Coerciveness of
Police Lies in Interrogations, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 487, 492 (2017) (“Consistent with courts’ deference
to the Miranda safeguard, once suspects have been Mirandized, courts have deemed confessions to
be voluntary despite police lies regarding the seriousness of the charges, promises of leniency, and
the presence of physical evidence and accomplice statements.”).
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
81 See Allyson J. Sharf et al., Evaluating Juvenile Detainees’ Miranda Misconceptions: The
Discriminant Validity of the Juvenile Miranda Quiz, 29 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 556, 557 (2017)
(describing the various prongs of Miranda and their focuses).
82 See, e.g., RICHARD ROGERS & ERIC DROGIN, MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS 29 (2014)
(“When questioned directly, most juveniles (71 percent) and adult respondents (69 percent) were
unaware that questioning could continue indeﬁnitely until they asserted their right to silence.”);
Heather Zelle et al., Juveniles’ Miranda Comprehension: Understanding, Appreciation, and Totality of
Circumstances Factors, 39 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 281, 291 (2015) (“The current study demonstrated the
discontinuity that can occur between understanding and appreciation of related items (e.g., knowing
that one can obtain a lawyer but not grasping what a lawyer is or does)”).
83 See FELD, supra note 9, at 43 (explaining that waivers are generally only invalidated “under
the most egregious circumstances,” and that judges “regularly ﬁnd that children as young as ten or
eleven[,] . . . with no prior” encounters with the justice system, validly waived their rights); see also
id. (explaining that because there are neither bright-line rules nor decisive factors to assess validity,
when a child claims to understand these rights, Fare does not compel judges to probe further).
84 Confessions must be voluntary based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law,” because an involuntary confession violates an individual’s liberty to
choose to confess. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; LIPPMAN, supra note 8, at 286. On the other hand,
suspects must be Mirandized based on the Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[no person] . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” because courts recognize that without
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thorough due process inquiry must follow such a ﬁnding of a valid waiver.
Conﬂating the two deprives suspects of their full constitutional protections.85
The totality of the circumstances test used to judge voluntariness provides
“the only check on police conduct in the high percentage of interrogations
where Miranda warnings have been provided and waived.”86 However, since
many courts fail to thoroughly engage in this test after ﬁnding a waiver of
Miranda, there has been little guidance about “permitted or prohibited
interrogation techniques . . . allow[ing] police to bring substantial pressures
to bear on vulnerable or unsophisticated suspects.”87 Without this guidance,
the voluntariness test remains elusive and police continue to use coercive
techniques on children.88
Therefore, rather than effectively ending the voluntariness inquiry based
on the objective perception that Miranda was waived, courts are
constitutionally required to engage in a voluntariness assessment. And because
this voluntariness standard remains vague, contract principles—which are
deemed necessary to ensure the voluntariness of contracts between bargaining
adults—may inform the voluntariness of confessions given by youth suspects
to adult interrogators. Without such protections, the fundamental rights of
youth are at risk of being undermined.
B. The Reid Method Unduly Influences Youth Suspects
Courts deem contracts the result of improper bargaining when a party
does not assent voluntarily, but instead assents because a superior party exerts
undue inﬂuence over them.89 In contract law, undue inﬂuence occurs where
one party has a particularly strong inﬂuence over the other and abuses that
inﬂuence to produce a better result for itself at the weaker party’s expense.90
Undue inﬂuence is seen in two general forms: (1) by exerting excessive
this warning, the inherently coercive nature of police interrogations may overwhelm suspects’ ability
to assert their right against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V; LIPPMAN, supra note 8, at 286.
85 Cf. Dorothy Heyl, The Limits of Deception: An End to the Use of Lies and Trickery in Custodial
Interrogations to Elicit the “Truth”?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 931, 938 (2013) (clarifying that Miranda does not
change the fact that the admissibility of a statement made “in custody must be judged solely by
whether [it was] ‘voluntary’”); Lapp, supra note 62, at 927 (recognizing that Miranda has shifted the
courts’ “attention from the due process issue of involuntariness to issues concerning the . . . waiver
of Miranda rights”).
86 Godsey, supra note 13, at 508.
87 FELD, supra note 9, at 16; see also id. at 17 (“High-proﬁle crimes create political pressures for
police to solve a crime and for judges to ﬁnd confessions voluntary despite strenuous interrogation
tactics.”).
88 See id. at 8 (“The Reid manuals . . . teach police to isolate suspects and to use psychological
tactics . . . to heighten their stress and anxiety and to manipulate their vulnerabilities to obtain
confessions . . . with children as with adults.”).
89 BLUM, supra note 71, at 442.
90 Id.
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pressure or unfair persuasion over the weaker party, often in oppressive
circumstances;91 or (2) by abusing the weaker party’s trust that the dominant
party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.92
The Reid Method of interrogation, which is a confrontational, accusatory
method of questioning, and the most common interrogation technique in the
United States,93 results in oﬃcers exerting undue inﬂuence over suspects in
both of these manners. While Reid interrogations are designed to exploit all
suspects’ vulnerabilities, youth suspects are particularly vulnerable to coercive
interrogation practices.94 Children are thus more prone to giving involuntary,
and often false confessions, due to the developmental diﬀerences between
juveniles and adults.95
First, I will explain how the Reid Method’s use of maximization
techniques, which exert pressure on the suspect to confess by accusing him of
lying,96 results in undue inﬂuence in the ﬁrst form of undue inﬂuence: unfair
persuasion. Next, I will demonstrate how the Reid Method’s use of
minimization techniques, which oﬀer ways to minimize the suspect’s
culpability,97 creates undue inﬂuence in the form of abuse of trust.
C. Maximization Techniques: Intimidation, Confrontation, and Extreme Pressure
Can Result in Undue Influence Through Over-Persuasion
Maximization techniques induce a confession by “convey[ing] the
interrogator’s . . . belief that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will
fail.”98 High-pressure maximization interrogations include confronting the
suspect, accusing the suspect of lying, continuously demanding the suspect
tell the truth, overriding any objections, warning about causing trouble for
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id.
See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1725-33 (describing the goals and tactics of the Reid Method).
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW
HUM. BEHAV. 3, 25 (2009) (explaining that research identifies two sets of risk factors for false
confessions: the first set pertains to situational factors—which are inherent with the Reid
Method—such as a lengthy custody and isolation, deprivation of sleep or other need states,
presentations of false evidence to make the suspect feel trapped, and implied promises of leniency,
and the second set “pertains to dispositional characteristics that render certain suspects highly
vulnerable to influence and false confessions—namely, adolescence and immaturity”).
95 See infra Part II (providing a more in-depth explanation of adolescent brain development);
see also FELD, supra note 9, at 252 (“Research on adolescent brain development, judgment, maturity,
and self-control demonstrates why younger juveniles are especially at risk.”).
96 See RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 135 (2008) (“If a
suspect denies that he committed the crime, interrogators frequently accuse him of lying.”).
97 See id. at 133 (“Interrogators seek to persuade the suspect that he is trapped and powerless,
to diminish his self-conﬁdence to deny the detectives’ accusations, and to oﬀer him a way to
seemingly minimize his culpability and mitigate his punishment if he provides a statement.”).
98 Kassin et al., supra note 94, at 12.
91
92
93
94
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others if no confession is made, and even presenting the suspect with real,
implied, or false evidence.99 False confession expert, Saul Kassin, explains
that these tactics ultimately “shift the suspect’s mental state from conﬁdent
to hopeless.”100
These maximization techniques, as the name suggests, are intended to
maximize the pressure on the suspect—pressure that feels all the more
intense on juvenile suspects. They take advantage of the suspect’s “mental,
moral, or emotional weakness,” and thereby “overcome the will without
convincing the judgment.”101 Although undue inﬂuence in contract law does
not require a ﬁnding of an authoritative relationship or misrepresentation,
courts consider these factors strong indicators of over-persuasion.102 In
addition, ﬁnding that an encounter takes place at an unusual time or place,
without a third-party advisor to the weaker party, or with the use of multiple
persuaders, further strengthens the case of over-persuasion.103
In the interrogation context, when oﬃcers employ Reid techniques, all of
these indicators of undue inﬂuence are present. First, the interrogator’s
position of power over the child is self-evident.104 Children are often taught
from an early age to respect authority and tend to have an increased eagerness
to please authority ﬁgures.105 Because juveniles are particularly compliant
toward authority ﬁgures, they are even more susceptible to these
interrogation techniques.106
Next, interrogators begin their interrogation with a presumption of
guilt.107 When youth are confronted with accusations of guilt, they are more
likely than adults to change their responses to fulﬁll the expectations of police
interrogators.108 Over time, this eﬀect is even more pronounced: research
shows that “[c]hildren who are asked the same question more than once may
99 See FELD, supra note 9, at 112 (describing each of the stages of maximization interrogations);
Kassin et al., supra note 94, at 12 (listing various maximization techniques).
100 Kassin et al., supra note 94, at 12.
101 Odorizzi v. Bloomﬁeld Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130 (1966).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 133.
104 See Hritz, supra note 79, at 499 (explaining that during an interrogation, a police oﬃcer is
“in a superior bargaining position” because they “are in complete control over the suspect’s
environment”).
105 See Cauﬀman & Steinberg, supra note 23, at 440 (recognizing that adolescents are more
likely “to make choices in compliance with the perceived desires of authority ﬁgures”).
106 See Andrew J. Greer, Note, Oh, The Places You’ll Go!—Prison: How False Evidence in Juvenile
Interrogations Unconstitutionally Coerces False Confessions, 10 DREXEL L. REV. ONLINE 741, 761 (2018)
(“Authoritarian pressures play no small role in false confessions among children.”).
107 See FELD, supra note 9, at 233 (explaining that interrogation is a guilt-presumptive process,
which “predisposes police to disbelieve true claims of innocence and to attend to information that
conﬁrms their belief ”).
108 See Cauﬀman & Steinberg, supra note 23, at 440 (recognizing that adolescents are more
likely “to make choices in compliance with the perceived desires of authority ﬁgures”).
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assume they gave the ‘wrong’ answer the ﬁrst time, and feel pressure to
provide the ‘right’ answer when the question is repeated.”109 This can result
in a child changing his story multiple times until receiving aﬃrmation from
the interrogator.110
The interrogation of an intellectually impaired teenage boy named
Brendan Dassey, which was highlighted in the popular Netﬂix documentary,
Making a Murderer, presents a clear example of this tendency of youth
suspects to guess what they believe interrogators want to hear.111 During his
four interrogations, which took place over a period of forty-eight hours,112
Dassey gave multiple conﬂicting statements when repeatedly asked who cut
the victim’s hair, ﬁnally admitting that he was “just guessing.”113 Then, when
asked repeatedly about the number of times the victim had been shot, he
changed his answer three times based on the feedback he received from the
interrogators.114 His ﬁrst two guesses resulted in dissatisﬁed responses from
the oﬃcer, so Dassey felt the need to make a third guess.115 The oﬃcer was
satisﬁed by this one, responding with praise: “That makes sense. Now we
believe you.”116
The guessing games that result from maximization techniques do not
represent reliable admissions of guilt. Instead, as confession expert Richard
Leo points out, they represent a child’s tendency to be “highly compliant[,]
. . . naively trusting of authority, acquiescent, and eager to please adult
ﬁgures,” making children “predisposed to be submissive when questioned by
police.”117 Despite the widely accepted unreliability of these guessing games,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider Dassey’s seemingly
109 John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications
for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 23 (1996).
110 See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1741 (explaining that the authoritative role of an oﬃcer causes
children “to seek the interrogator’s approval and to respond with the ‘right’ answers, even if they do
not know what those are”).
111 See Brief of Independent Law Enforcement Instructors and Consultants as Amici Curiae
In Support of Petitioner at 13-20, Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 2677 (2018) (No. 17-1172) (explaining how and why Dassey revised his answers to satisfy
interrogators); MAKING A MURDERER (Netﬂix Dec. 18, 2015) (same).
112 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Won’t Hear the Case of Brendan Dassey, Sentenced to Life as
a Teen and Featured in ‘Making a Murderer’, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-wont-hear-the-case-ofbrendan-dassey-a-teen-sentenced-to-life-and-featured-in-making-a-murderer/2018/06/25/
6f97336e-787c-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html [https://perma.cc/6QXC-2ZK5].
113 Brief of Independent Law Enforcement Instructors and Consultants, supra note 111, at 13-16.
114 Id. at 18-19.
115 See id. at 18-20 (recognizing that Dassey was merely “ﬁshing for ‘correct answers,’” and that
he tailored his guesses based on suggestive questions he was given and the praise he received when
they were satisﬁed).
116 Id. at 20.
117 Leo, supra note 50, at 336.
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textbook example of an involuntary confession to be involuntary.118 Instead,
the court held that the confession was voluntary, reasoning that Dassey,
despite his intellectual disabilities and age, “spoke with the interrogators
freely, after receiving and understanding Miranda warnings,”119 further
demonstrating that courts today often rely too heavily on the presence of a
Miranda warning, without further engaging in a thorough totality of the
circumstances assessment of voluntariness.
1. Isolation: A Contributing Factor to Undue Inﬂuence
Through Over-Persuasion
Isolation intensiﬁes pressure on suspects, and youth are particularly
susceptible to this pressure because children have a heightened tendency to
favor short-term, immediate rewards—like complying with an authoritative
ﬁgure in hopes of ending an interrogation—without thoroughly considering
the consequences.120 As one commentator put it, when “[f]acing overbearing
interrogators who refuse to take no for an answer, [a child] may reason that
telling interrogators what they want to hear is the only way to escape.”121
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Executive’s
Guide to Effective Juvenile Interviews and Interrogations summarizes
direct accounts from many youth who explain they falsely confessed because
they wanted to put an end to the confrontational, intimidating

118 See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 313 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Given the many relevant facts
and the substantial weight of factors supporting a ﬁnding that Dassey’s confession was voluntary,
the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.”);
MAKING A MURDERER, supra note 111 (documenting the Seventh Circuit’s decision). For procedural
context, prior to this decision, U.S. Magistrate Judge William Duﬃn had overturned Dassey’s
conviction in August 2016, citing his age and lack of guardianship during his interrogation. Dassey
v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 1006 (E.D. Wis. 2016). When state prosecutors appealed, a threejudge panel for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals aﬃrmed Duﬃn’s ruling in June 2017 by a 2–1
vote. Dassey v. Dittmann, 860 F.3d 933, 983 (7th Cir. 2017). It was not until prosecutors appealed
again that the entire Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, resulting in a 4–3 holding that the confession
was voluntary. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 301.
119 Dassey, 877 F.3d at 301.
120 See LEO, supra note 96, at 233 (“Youth (especially young children) . . . lack the cognitive
capacity and judgment to fully understand the nature or gravity of an interrogation or the long-term
consequences of their responses to police questions.”); id. at 203 (“The combined eﬀect of these
multiple stressors may overwhelm the suspect’s cognitive capacities such that he confesses simply to
terminate what has become an intolerably stressful experience.”); Kassin et al., supra note 94, at 16
(explaining that suspects endure “prolonged isolation from signiﬁcant others” which “constitutes a
form of deprivation that can heighten a suspect’s distress and incentive to remove himself or herself
from the situation”).
121 LEO, supra note 96, at 203; see also FELD, supra note 9, at 240 (explaining that “[t]he
isolation, stress, and anxiety associated with interrogation intensify their desire to extricate
themselves by the short-term expedient of confessing”).
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interrogation.122 These youth compared the feeling of being interrogated to
“an 18-wheeler driving on your chest and you believe that the only way to
get that weight off your chest is to tell the police whatever they want to
hear”123 and feeling as though “[you are] choking, like there was no more air
left in the room.”124 One explained he confessed because, “I was tired, I was
scared, they wouldn’t accept anything else from me . . . . They kept giving
me suggestions, giving me some narratives that would make sense and I just
picked the ones I thought they wanted to hear the most.”125 Finally, another
explained that she “never thought of the consequences,” but “just said it
because they wanted [her] to.”126
2. Misrepresentation: A Type of Undue Inﬂuence
Through Over-Persuasion
Misrepresentation is another strong indicator of improper undue
inﬂuence through over-persuasion because it occurs when the dominant
subject applies pressure on the servient object to a degree that inﬂuences their
decision.127 Misrepresentation is generally distinct from coercion as a matter
of contract law,128 but I group it with undue inﬂuence because
misrepresenting facts to suspects leads to over-persuasion, especially in youth
suspects—despite the fact that interrogators may misrepresent facts without
running afoul to criminal procedures. Richard Leo, a juvenile justice scholar,
explains that confronting a suspect with false evidence is a commonly used
interrogation technique because “[e]vidence ploys are used to make a suspect
perceive that the case against him is so overwhelming that he has no choice
but to confess because no one will believe his assertions of innocence.”129 This
122 See IACP, supra note 31 (summarizing how children responded to the pressures of
interrogation); see also FELD, supra note 9, at 234 (explaining that confrontational interrogations
lead to false confessions because the factors involved in such interrogations “increase susceptibility
to social inﬂuences, impair complex decision-making, and heighten suggestibility”).
123 IACP, supra note 31, at 4.
124 Id. at 14.
125 Id. at 3. Cf. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 861 (“[T]he factual accuracy of statements . . . is
obviously problematic where the only means of halting an interrogation is to assent to the views of
the interrogator.”).
126 IACP, supra note 31, at 8.
127 Cf. Odorizzi v. Bloomﬁeld Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130 (1966) (explaining that a
ﬁnding of undue inﬂuence does not necessarily require a ﬁnding of misrepresentation, because “a
person’s will may be overborne” even without such a condition, but that “[p]ressure of whatever sort
which overpowers the will without convincing the judgment is a species of restraint under which no
valid contract can be made”).
128 Id.
129 LEO, supra note 96, at 139; see also Hritz, supra note 79, at 498 (“[L]ies can vary targets’
estimates of the costs and beneﬁts of a course of action. For example, lies may foster an unnecessary
loss of conﬁdence in the targets’ best option . . . [or] may eliminate or obscure the targets’ perception
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type of over-persuasion through misrepresentation should be prohibited
because it threatens the reliability of the confessions it yields.
In contract law, when a court ﬁnds fraudulent misrepresentation, the
contract will be voidable because the agreement was not truly voluntary—it
was obtained by deceit.130 To prove that a party engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation, the party must have (1) knowingly or recklessly made a
false representation, on which (2) the party intended for another to rely, and
(3) caused injury to the other party.131
The same deﬁnition should apply to suspects who enter confessions in
response to misrepresentations by interrogators. An examination of the
interrogation of seventeen-year-old Martin Tankleﬀ demonstrates why.132
After Tankleﬀ came home to ﬁnd his mother stabbed to death and father near
death, he called 911.133 Next, he went with the police to the station intending
to give them information about his father’s business partner, whom he
suspected committed the attack.134 The police, however, had already deemed
him a suspect, and they proceeded to subject him to an intense
interrogation.135 The officers repeatedly confronted him with accusations of
guilt.136 At one point, an officer pretended to take a call outside the
interrogation room.137 When he re-entered, he told Tankleff that his father
came out of the coma and asserted that it was Tankleff who stabbed his
mother.138 After being presented with this lie, Tankleff began to doubt his
own innocence: he asked the officers, “Could I have blacked out and done
of relevant alternatives.”). Lying may be particularly problematic with youth, who already have
trouble engaging in a proper cost-beneﬁt analysis. See Marsha Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The
United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for
Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far
Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 509 n.53 (2012) (citing Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating
Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995) (“[B]ecause
adolescents tend to discount the future and weigh more heavily the short-term risks and beneﬁts,
they may experience heightened pressure from the immediate coercion they face.”).
130 BLUM, supra note 71, at 419.
131 Fraudulent
Misrepresentation, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fraudulent_misrepresentation
[https://perma.cc/JNV5-JBVC]
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
132 Brief of the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 17-19,
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2677 (2018) (No. 17-1172)
(citing a compilation from People v. Tankleff, 199 A.D.2d 550, 606 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1993), People v.
Tankleff, 49 A.D.3d 160, 848 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2007), and Marty Tankleff ’s Fight for the Truth, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 26, 2008), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marty-tankleffs-fight-for-the-truth/
[https://perma.cc/4LDE-TMJA]).
133 Id. at 17.
134 Id. at 18.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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it? . . . Could I be possessed?”139 The officer responded, “I think that’s what
happened to you.”140 Tankleff then confessed.141 Realizing his mistake, he
“almost immediately recanted” and refused to sign the confession.142 This
unsigned confession, however, remained the foundation for the
prosecution’s case.143 Tankleff was found guilty and sentenced to fifty
years.144 He spent seventeen of those years in prison until new evidence
suggested that it was, in fact, the business partner who orchestrated the
murders of Tankleff ’s parents.145
Here, the oﬃcer (1) knowingly and intentionally falsely represented that
the father came out of the coma and inculpated Tankleﬀ. It (2) was intended
for Tankleﬀ to rely on this representation and confess. Indeed, in extreme
circumstances, oﬃcers may be so persuasive that they cause an innocent child
to internalize the accusation and believe he is actually responsible for a crime
he never committed.146 That was the case here: once Tankleﬀ was presented
with this false evidence, he went from aﬃrmatively asserting his innocence,
to doubting himself, to asking the oﬃcers whether he could have possibly
committed these acts while in a diﬀerent state of consciousness.147 This
sequence of events epitomizes undue inﬂuence through “persuasion which
overcomes the will without convincing the judgment.”148 This confession was
the product of manipulative, false evidence. Finally, inducing this confession
(3) caused injury to the party because the confession—despite being recanted

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18-19; People v. Tankleﬀ, 49 A.D.3d 160, 182-83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
See, e.g., Laurel LaMontagne, Comment, Children Under Pressure: The Problem of Juvenile
False Confessions and Potential Solutions, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 31-33 (2013). The author explains
the experience that induced fourteen-year-old Michael Crowe to falsely confess to the murder of
his sister. Michael was subjected to lies, isolation, and false promises, and after repeatedly being
told by his interrogators that he killed his sister, Michael went from denying this allegation to
doubting himself. Id. at 31. Eventually, he confessed: “I’m not sure how I did it. All I know is I did
it.” Id. Later, he was exonerated by DNA evidence, and following his release explained,
“[e]ventually, [the police] wear you down to where you don’t even trust yourself. You can’t trust
your memory anymore.” Id.
147 Brief of the Innocent Network, supra note 132, at 18.
148 Odorizzi v. Bloomﬁeld Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130 (1966); see also FELD, supra
note 9, at 242 (“Stressful conditions may cause children to change their stories and to actually believe
their distorted version of the event.”); Hritz, supra note 79, at 497-98 (explaining that lies told by
police can “distort . . . information and therefore distort the situations as the targets of the lies
perceive them”).
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
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and unsigned—was the foundation of the prosecution’s case, resulting in his
conviction and ﬁfty-year sentence.149
In addition to case law, experiments also demonstrate that presenting
suspects with false evidence induces them to accept blame for actions they
did not take.150 In one study, college students were warned not to press the
ALT-key while typing because it would cause the computer to crash.151 To
account for varying levels of vulnerability, one group was prompted to type
at a slow pace, while the other was prompted to type at a fast pace.152
Experimenters manipulated the crash of each of the computers and accused
each student of pressing the ALT-key.153 During these accusations, half of the
students within the fast-paced group and half within the slow-paced group
were told that a confederate had witnessed them press the ALT-key—a form
of false evidence.154 Despite their innocence, 100% of the subjects in the fastpaced group presented with this false evidence signed written confessions.155
This rate of confession was 35% higher than the fast-paced group that was not
told there was a witness, and 65% higher than the slow-paced group without
a witness.156 Although this experiment did not involve a crime, it
demonstrates how false evidence can induce suspects, particularly those who
are most vulnerable, to accept responsibility for acts they did not commit.
D. Minimization Techniques: Feigning Friendship, Solidarity, and Leniency Can
Result in Undue Influence Through Abuse of Trust
Minimization techniques used in juvenile interrogations induce
confessions by providing justiﬁcations for the alleged acts and implying the
child will feel better or beneﬁt from confessing.157 The minimization tactics
employed by interrogators include sympathizing with the child, rationalizing
149 See IACP, supra note 31, at 3 (“No evidence is more valuable than a defendant’s own
admission of guilt.”); see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 63, at 961 (“[C]onfession evidence is
inherently prejudicial and highly damaging to a defendant, even if it is the product of coercive
interrogation, even if it is supported by no other evidence, and even if it is ultimately proven false
beyond any reasonable doubt.”).
150 See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 127 (May 1996) (providing
support for this notion and suggesting that the memory can be altered for recent actions); Allison
D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age
and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 148 (1996) (ﬁnding that younger kids were much
more likely to take responsibility when presented with false evidence).
151 Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 150, at 126.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 127.
156 Id.
157 FELD, supra note 9, at 126-27.
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the crime by understating its seriousness, and implying promises of
leniency.158 The goal is to induce a statement by framing a confession as the
suspect’s best option.159
Applying the contract law lens, using multiple minimization techniques
in an interrogation presents undue inﬂuence through abuse of trust. In
contract law, the dominant feature of this type of unfair persuasion is the
exploitation of a weaker party’s trust in the dominant party.160 Society teaches
children to trust the police, creating for them the justiﬁed assumption that
interrogating oﬃcers “will not act in a manner inconsistent with [their]
welfare.”161 Since society holds oﬃcers to a higher moral standard162 and
youth tend to be “naively trusting of authority,”163 training oﬃcers to use
implied promises of help or leniency during youth interrogations is
particularly problematic. Yet the Reid technique does just that.
The IACP report explains, “these indirect promises of leniency . . . can
trigger involuntary or false confessions by presenting the juvenile with an
oﬀer he can’t refuse: say what the police want to hear or face negative
consequences.”164 One seventeen-year-old explained how he “had the
perception that the police were there to help,” so he “signed a confession
under the pretense that [he] was going to go home later on that night, but it
didn’t work out that way.”165
Brendan Dassey’s case presents another example. Here, the oﬃcers
feigned allegiance to Dassey as they reassured him, “Mark and I both are in
your corner[.] We’re on your side.”166 They also feigned sympathy167 and
rationalized his alleged actions as “mistakes” that he was forced into.168 By
Kassin et al., supra note 94, at 12.
Id.
BLUM, supra note 71, at 442.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (identifying the circumstances
where undue inﬂuence is “unfair persuasion of a party”); see also Spierer, supra note 38, at 1741
(“[C]hildren are taught to trust adults from a young age, and to regard law enforcement oﬃcers with
both respect and deference.”).
162 Hritz, supra note 79, at 501.
163 See Leo, supra note 96, at 233 (“[J]uveniles . . . are highly compliant [and] tend to be
immature, naively trusting of authority, acquiescent, and eager to please adult ﬁgures. They are thus
predisposed to be submissive when questioned by police.”).
164 IACP, supra note 31, at 9.
165 Id. at 15.
166 Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (E.D. Wis. 2016); see also id. at 970 (“[N]o
matter what you did, we can work through that. OK. We can’t make any promises but we’ll stand
behind you no matter what you did. OK. Because you’re being the good guy here.”).
167 See id. (“[F]rom what I’m seeing . . . I’m thinking you’re all right. OK, you don’t have to
worry about things.”).
168 See id. at 971-72 (“We know what happened, it’s OK . . . It’s not your fault, he makes you do
it.”); see also Transcript of Interview by Marinette County Detectives with Brendan Dassey at 29
(Nov. 6. 2005) [hereinafter Dassey Interview], http://www.stevenaverycase.org/wp158
159
160
161
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stating, “We know what happened, it’s OK . . . . It’s not your fault, he makes
you do it,” the interrogators minimized Dassey’s culpability to help move him
to a confession.169 They also made clear that they would not accept Dassey’s
denials of guilt, which prompted him to take the “out” they were oﬀering.170
Finally, the oﬃcers implied that only a confession would help him.171 While
the interrogators repeatedly emphasized the need to be “honest,” they made
clear that their deﬁnition of “honesty” was a willingness to adopt their
preferred version of events.172
Children not only have a tendency to trust authority ﬁgures and acquiesce
to them—they also tend to lack the ability to properly weigh the costs and
beneﬁts of doing so.173 As discussed above, children tend to discount the
future and prioritize potential immediate gains over long-term losses.174
Therefore, when interrogators imply a confession can help them or end the
interrogation, juveniles are not only more likely to trust this implied
promise,175 but are also more likely to over-value this immediate gain over the
unknown consequences that may stem from this confession.176 Taken as a

content/uploads/2016/03/Brendan-Dassey-Interview-Transcript-2005Nov06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7YF-JM5B] (“[P]eople don’t mean to make mistakes but they do. Okay. The
only way to make your mistakes right is by tellin’ the truth, okay?”).
169 Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 971; see also FELD, supra note 9, at 234 (“Minimization provides
a moral justiﬁcation . . . to neutralize guilt [which] may induce innocent people to adopt the
proﬀered excuses as a mean[s] to end questioning.”).
170 Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 972. For an explanation that these rationalizations create a false
choice between the lesser of two evils, see Megan Crane et al., The Truth About Juvenile False
Confessions, 16 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 13 (2016) (explaining that in Dassey’s case, after the
oﬃcers made clear that they believed he was guilty, they gave him two options: saying he chose to
commit the act on his own, which would make him “look like a monster,” or taking this “out,” which
would portray him “in a less heinous light”).
171 See Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (“[H]onesty is the only thing that will set you free. Right?”).
172 See id. at 972 (“Brendan, be honest. You were there when she died and we know that. Don’t
start lying now. We know you were there . . . We already know, don’t lie to us now, OK, come on.”);
cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) (explaining that oﬃcers using the Reid Method
“are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the oﬀense . . . . These tactics are designed to
put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police
purport to know already . . . .”).
173 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
39-40 (2010) (discussing the diﬀerences between adolescents and adults in considering long-term
consequences and providing several scientiﬁc explanations for this disparity).
174 See infra Section II.C (explaining why children are more likely to emphasize immediate
rewards rather than long-term consequences).
175 See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1741-42 (“More often than not, juveniles focus solely on any
semblance of short-term relief, and fail to comprehend the long-term consequences of their actions.”).
176 See LaMontagne, supra note 146, at 36 (“When faced with options in an interrogation,
juveniles tend to act impulsively and prioritize an immediate outcome without balancing it against
future consequences.”).

1450

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1425

whole, interrogations that employ these techniques result in selfincriminating statements that are rarely voluntary, and are oftentimes false.177
IV. EMBRACING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO PROMPT A SHIFT
FROM CONFESSION-SEEKING TACTICS TO
INFORMATION-SEEKING TACTICS
Involuntary and false confessions are “inextricably linked to police
interrogation procedures,” and youth are over twice as likely as adults to fall
victim to the combined use of maximization and minimization tactics.178
Given the developmental diﬀerences between youth and adults, it comes as
no surprise that children make up a disproportionate number of false
confessions.179 The oﬃcer ﬁrst gets a child to feel trapped and hopeless,
recognizing some suspects will succumb when confronted with guilt.180 The
oﬃcer then oﬀers him a way to “seemingly minimize his culpability and
mitigate his punishment if he provides a statement,” recognizing others will
be persuaded by a perceived promise to avoid harsher punishment.181
Employing this “double-barreled” approach overwhelms the suspect’s
resistance and encourages him to admit responsibility.182 Sometimes, oﬃcers
will toggle between these contrasting techniques multiple times over the
course of one interview.183 Using these techniques in tandem creates
confusion and psychological distress for youth who tend to be more willing

177 Crane et al., supra note 170, at 13; see also Naomi E. S. Goldstein et al., Good-Bye to Waiver:
A Developmental Argument Against Youth’s Waiver of Miranda Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 35 (2018) (“[P]olice often exploit the vulnerabilities of youth by capitalizing on both
their susceptibility to pressure and authority, as well as their difficulties with abstract thinking
and reasoning.”).
178 Redlich & Goodman, supra note 150, at 154; see also FELD, supra note 9, at 231 (“False
confessions occur when police erroneously misclassify an innocent person as guilty and then use
confrontational tactics—maximization and minimization—to elicit an admission.”).
179 See Crane et al., supra note 170, at 12 (“In a study of 125 proven false confessions, 63% of
false confessors were under the age of twenty-ﬁve . . . . Another study of 340 exonerations found
that 42% of juveniles studied had falsely confessed, compared with only 13% of adults.”); see also
Spierer, supra note 38, at 1730 (“The dangerous combination that results from children’s
developmental deﬁciencies in the interrogation room, on the one hand, and the structure of the
modern interrogation process, on the other hand, leads to a disproportionately high incidence of
false confessions among juvenile suspects.”).
180 LEO, supra note 96, at 133; see also infra Section III.C (explaining the Reid Method’s use of
maximization techniques).
181 Id.; see also infra Section III.D (explaining the Reid Method’s use of minimization techniques).
182 Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 433 (2013).
183 See, e.g., Dassey Interview, supra note 168, at 29-40 (showing how Detective Baldwin initially
feigns friendship with Dassey before exerting pressure on him, repeatedly accusing him of lying, and
then comforting Dassey again).
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to submit to authority ﬁgures and unable to accurately weigh the costs and
beneﬁts of their choices.184
The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of providing youth with
the “safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions . . . are not
the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth.”185
But legal and scientiﬁc recognition alone is not enough. The voluntariness
standard, as it stands, remains vague, prompting judges to rely too heavily on
Miranda, rather than inquire into what practices are actually used on youth
during an interrogation.186
The imprecision of this voluntariness standard could be cured through an
application of contract law principles.187 In contract law, when a bargaining
adult’s will is overcome by undue inﬂuence, any resulting contract is voidable
because his assent was not truly voluntary.188 Similarly, when a suspect
confesses as a result of “his will ha[ving] be[en] overborne” by undue
inﬂuence, such a confession should be inadmissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was not truly voluntary.189
Encouraging judges to assess voluntariness with an eye towards undue
inﬂuence and misrepresentation would provide clearer guidance to both
oﬃcers and judges about the boundaries of permissible police conduct.190
Further, it will result in heightened scrutiny being applied to Reid Methodinduced confessions, which are inherently likely to place undue inﬂuence on
184 Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 357; see also Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts
a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 274 (2007) (“With limited defenses
to police tactics, children have a reduced ability to cope with a stressful interrogation and are less likely
to possess the psychological and emotional abilities to withstand the rigors of police questioning.”).
185 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
186 See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness
Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (explaining that, while Due Process voluntariness requirements
still apply, the standard is “as hazy and unfocused as ever . . . and almost always arriving at the
conclusion that what the police did was, all things considered, acceptable”).
187 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, “[t]he line between proper and permissible police
conduct and techniques and methods oﬀensive to due process is, at best, a diﬃcult one to draw”).
188 Odorizzi v. Bloomﬁeld Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130 (1966).
189 See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (explaining that the test of
voluntariness turns on whether a confession was the product of free choice or coercion: if “he has
willed to confess, it may be used against him . . . [but] if his will has been overborne and his capacity
for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession oﬀends due process”); see also
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (explaining that confessions achieved by “threats,
promises, or inducements, which torture the mind but put no scar on the body . . . [may] not only
break[] the will to conceal or lie, but may even break the will to stand by the truth”).
190 See Michael Wayne Brooks, Kids Waiving Goodbye to Their Rights: An Argument Against
Juveniles’ Ability to Waive Their Right to Remain Silent During Police Interrogations, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 219, 241 (“The totality test is unfair to all parties involved: police do not have clear guidance;
courts are faced with an almost entirely discretionary decision as to whether or not to admit
evidence; and minors are left vulnerable to the discretion of law enforcement and the courts.”).
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juvenile suspects. Knowing such scrutiny will be applied when the Reid
Method is used will prompt oﬃcers to shift from confession-seeking
interrogations to investigative interrogations.191
Such a shift will help reduce involuntary confessions, given that the
confrontational and manipulative tactics endorsed by the Reid method
“prevent a person from making a free-will choice to remain silent—the
antithesis of voluntariness.”192 It will also help reduce the number of false
confessions, because as the Supreme Court recognizes, the narrow focus on
extracting confessions encourages the use of unfair tactics on vulnerable
children, increasing the risk that they falsely confess.193
A. The PEACE Method: A Move Towards Preserving the Voluntariness of
Confessions
Investigating oﬃcers can shift their focus from eliciting a confession to
eliciting accurate information from suspects by abandoning the Reid
maximization and minimization techniques in favor of factﬁnding techniques
that comply with the voluntariness principles imported by contract law. The
PEACE method, which is widely accepted in the United Kingdom, oﬀers a
realistic alternative.194 PEACE stands for the ﬁve stages of this interview
method: (1) prepare and plan; (2) engage and explain; (3) account; (4) closure;
and (5) evaluate.195 This method has been accurately described as “a nonaccusatory interview designed to develop suﬃcient investigative information
to determine the suspect’s possible involvement in the criminal behavior
under investigation.”196 It is more developmentally appropriate for youth

191 See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1724 (arguing that holding the Reid technique unconstitutional,
due to “its presumption of guilt and reliance on coercion and deceit,” would lead to a shift to PEACE
techniques which would “help protect children within the bounds created by the Court’s precedent
and prevent juveniles from falsely confessing with such regularity”).
192 FELD, supra note 9, at 244.
193 See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009) (“[T]here is mounting empirical
evidence that these pressures [of psychological interrogation] can induce a frighteningly high
percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.”).
194 See Spierer, supra note 38, at 1746-49 (“U.S. interrogators could utilize the PEACE method
from the United Kingdom—a method that instructs police to resolve cases through careful planning
and investigative interviewing . . . .”).
195 Douglass Starr, The Interview: Do Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False Confessions?
THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/theinterview-7 [https://perma.cc/FQR7-5UNS].
196

Id. at 1749.

2020]

Juvenile Due Process

1453

because it is less confrontational and manipulative than the Reid Method, and
is more conversational and focused on obtaining information.197
The PEACE method requires oﬃcers to explain the objectives of the
interview to the suspect, elicit the suspect’s side of the story through openended conversational questions, and actively listen to the content elicited to
evaluate if it corroborates any preexisting evidence.198 In contrast to the Reid
Method, it prohibits the use of false evidence, confrontational questioning,
promises of leniency, and lessening the seriousness of the crime, all of which
have been proven to overcome the will of a susceptible child, resulting in
involuntary, and often false confessions.199 While critics may argue methods
like this will not be eﬀective in obtaining confessions from guilty
perpetrators, PEACE has been proven to be “as eﬀective as current coercive
interrogation practices in eliciting confessions from criminals, but [has]
reduce[d] the incidence of false confessions since it does not subject innocent
suspects to psychological coercion.”200
In practice, assessing interrogations through a contractual lens also
requires all police–suspect interviews to be electronically recorded. An
electronic recording holds oﬃcers accountable. It also creates an objective
record201 for the court to use in assessing whether a confession was voluntary
or coerced.202 In addition, recordings provide oﬃcers both protections against
“frivolous allegations of abuse”203 and a reliable account of the interview so
they will not need to rely on notes or memory.204 Lastly, recordings pay for
themselves by reducing the need for costly pretrial hearings to determine

197 See id. at 1748 (“The PEACE method is an interrogation style that is less confrontational,
less accusatory, less deceptive, more conversational, and more focused on gathering information (as
opposed to getting a confession).”).
198 Id. at 1748-49.
199 FELD, supra note 9, at 256-57.
200 Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid
Technique, 57 CRIM. L.Q. 509, 541 (2011); see also LaMontagne, supra note 146, at 54 (“Since
implementing these non-adversarial practices, England has not seen a significant drop in the
frequency of confessions. Research has also supported the claim that less confrontational interviewing
techniques can lower the rate of false confessions without affecting the rate of true confessions.”).
201 For information about the proper way to obtain an objective recording, see False Confessions &
Recording
of
Custodial
Interrogations,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessions-recording-interrogations/ [https://perma.cc/T9N8XWCA], explaining that a video recording will only be reliable if the camera is focused only on the
interrogator or on both the suspect and the interrogator. When it is fixed on the suspect only, jurors tend
to conclude the confession was voluntary. Id.
202 FELD, supra note 9, at 263; see also id. at 7 (explaining that, without a recording, “[t]he
interrogation room is a trial—confessions determine guilt, and defendants have no record on which
to appeal for judicial review.”).
203 IACP, supra note 31, at 12.
204 FELD, supra note 9, at 263.
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what happened during the interrogation.205 In the United Kingdom, recordings
have been mandatory for over twenty years,206 and in the United States, sixteen
states and the District of Columbia mandate electronic recordings of
interviews.207 This practice has not come at the expense of law enforcement.208
Knowing that the presence of undue inﬂuence through over-persuasion
or abuse of trust may make a confession legally involuntary would incentivize
oﬃcers to embrace this shift from confession-driven techniques to less
coercive factﬁnding alternatives. Encouraging judges to determine
voluntariness with an eye towards these contract law principles is not an
unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court’s protection of youth. In fact,
it is warranted by the need to bring interrogation law in line with other areas
of the law, since youth are at a heightened risk of due process violations.
Further, it would recognize the disproportionate number of false confessions
obtained from youth, the psychological research on developmental
diﬀerences that explain this disproportion, and the legal ﬁndings that these
diﬀerences warrant additional legal safeguards.

IACP, supra note 31, at 12.
FELD, supra note 9, at 262-63.
IACP, supra note 31, at 12.
Id.; see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Does Video Recording Inhibit Crime Suspects?, 43 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 45, 52-53 (2019) (ﬁnding that randomly informing suspects that their interrogations
were being recorded did not impact how often or how much they spoke, their tendency to waive
Miranda rights, or make admissions of guilt).
205
206
207
208

